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Abstract
We assess the effectiveness of different public policy instruments for the creation of
active venture capital markets. Our methodology focusses on ’innovation ratios,’ de-
fined to be the shares of high-tech, and of early stage, venture capital investments.
We study a unique panel of data for 14 European countries between 1988 and 2001.
We have several novel findings. First, we find no evidence of a shortage of supply of
venture capital funds in Europe, a result which questions the effectiveness of the most
widely used policy for fostering active venture capital markets. We also find other
policies to be effective. In particular, the opening of stock markets targeted at entre-
preneurial companies has a positive, large effect on the innovation ratios. Reductions
in the corporate capital gains tax rate increase the share of both high-tech and early
stage investment. A reduction in labor regulation also results in a higher share of
high-tech investments. Finally, we find no evidence of an effect of increased public
R&D spending on the innovation ratios.
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1 Introduction
Venture capital is a form of financial intermediation particularly well suited to support the
creation and growth of innovative, entrepreneurial companies (Hellmann and Puri (2000,
2002), Kortum and Lerner (2000)). It specializes in financing and nurturing companies at
an early stage of development (’start-ups’) that operate in high-tech industries. For these
companies the expertise of the venture capitalist, its knowledge of markets and of the
entrepreneurial process, and its network of contacts are most useful to help unfold their
growth potential (Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann (2005a), Gompers (1995), Hellmann
and Puri (2002), and Lerner (1994, 1995)). By contrast, when venture capital is applied to
companies at a later stage of their growth, or in companies which operate in technologically
mature industries, it has less of an opportunity to ’make a difference’ (Michelacci and
Suarez (2004)). Economics thus points to the desirability of providing an adequate share
of venture investments in high-tech and early stage companies.
Such a goal has been shared by public policy, which appreciates the possibility to
foster venture capital for achieving economic growth and job creation ((Bottazzi and Da
Rin (2002a), European Commission (2003)). Governments around the world have been
trying to replicate the success that venture capital has achieved in the United States
(Megginson (2004)). These attempts absorb large sums of public money. Yet, we know
very little about what policies can really help create active venture capital markets. Our
study contributes a first step towards filling this gap. While we cannot evaluate both the
benefits and the costs of alternative policy instruments for active venture capital markets,
we can contribute a rigorous assessment of what their impact has been the recent European
experience.
We start by discussing the methodological challenges to assessing the effectiveness of
alternative public policies for venture capital. We propose an empirical approach which
allows to minimize the risk of omitting relevant explanatory variables. This relies on the
notion of ’innovation ratios.’ These are defined to be the ratio of high-tech investments
to total venture investments (high-tech ratio), and the ratio of early stage investments to
total venture investments (early stage ratio).
These ratios are useful for methodological reasons, but also for their substantive mean-
ing: they measure the extent to which venture capital markets are active, i.e., provide
support for high-tech and early stage ventures. By looking at the innovation ratios we
can better understand how policy can make venture capital markets not only larger but
also more effective–i.e., better able to cater to those firms which most benefit from the
support of a venture capitalist.
Economic analysis has identified several policies as potentially useful for the develop-
ment of active venture capital markets. For each of them we discuss the predicted effect
on the innovation ratios. First, theory suggests that innovative start-ups suffer from credit
constraints, and that these constraints are more severe for high-tech and early stage firms.
Such constraints may be overcome by public policies which increase the supply of funds
available for early stage and high-tech investment. This would stimulate venture invest-
ments in high-tech and early stage firms, and so result in higher innovation ratios. The
other relevant policies influence the innovation ratios by affecting the expected (after tax,
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risk-adjusted) return to new ventures. A higher expected return reduces credit rationing
and so increases the innovation ratios. Taxation affects the return to investors and en-
trepreneurs in several ways. A lower corporate capital gains tax increases the return to
investors. A lower differential between the personal tax rate and the capital gains tax
rate makes leaving a job and becoming an entrepreneur more attractive. Lower corporate
income taxation increases the return to both investors and entrepreneurs by increasing
the present value of future (after tax) corporate income. Beyond taxation, the existence of
viable exit markets for venture investments also increases the expected return to investors
and entrepreneurs. Policies which result in the creation of stock markets suitable for listing
entrepreneurial companies are therefore expected to increase the innovation ratios. The
expected return to investors and entrepreneurs can also be made higher by policies that
increase the stock of R&D, giving rise to technological spillovers, and in turn to valuable
entrepreneurial opportunities. Finally, the reduction of barriers to entrepreneurship–such
as restrictions to hiring and firing workers–lowers the regulatory costs to entrepreneurial
activity. A rigorous, comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness of these interventions
can provide useful insights to policy-makers.
We take these predictions to the data, and study the experience of 14 European coun-
tries betweeen 1988 and 2001 with a panel methodology, using innovation ratios as de-
pendent variables. We introduce for the first time a panel dimension for several measures
of taxation, for the existence of stock markets for entrepreneurial companies, and for a
measure of hiring and firing restrictions in labor markets. Given the nature of our data,
which come from a rather homogeneous set of developed economies, and the question we
want to address, we choose to estimate ’within-country’ effects. This implies that we can
evaluate what governments can do to increase the innovation ratios rather than explain
cross-country variation in the values of the innovation ratios.
Our results challenge the prevailing policy approach, as we do not find any evidence
of a shortage of venture capital funds for European companies: an increase in the supply
of funds has no effect on the innovation ratios. Rather, we find that the opening of ’New’
stock markets for entrepreneurial companies has a large positive impact on both the high-
tech and early stage ratios. Our panel setting thus provides support for the importance
of creating exit options for venture capital, as suggested by Black and Gilson (1998) and
Michelacci and Suarez (2004). Taxation also matters. In particular, a reduction of the
corporate capital gains taxation has a positive effect on the innovation ratios; this sup-
ports the prediction of Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004) that lower capital gains taxation
stimulates monitoring by venture capitalists by raising the return to their effort. A reduc-
tion in hiring and firing restrictions also has a positive effect on the high-tech ratio, while
changes in public R&D have no effect on it. Overall, the European experience suggests
that the creation of active venture capital markets might depend on providing investors
and entrepreneurs with the possibility to reap the benefits of their efforts rather than on
providing them with more funds.
Our results complement and advance those of previous studies–starting with the semi-
nal contribution of Gompers and Lerner (1998)–and put them on a firmer methodological
ground.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the challenges in
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estimating the effects of public policy on venture capital markets, motivates our empirical
strategy and choice of policy variables, and describes recent policy programmes for venture
capital markets in the European context. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 reports
our results, and is followed by a brief conclusion.
2 Assessing public policy for active venture capital markets
2.1 Estimating the effects of public policy: the challenges
Since our goal is to provide an assessment of how different policies can help create active
venture capital markets, the innovation ratios form the cornerstone of our analysis. There
are two reasons for this, one substantial and one methodological. From a substantive point
of view, we are not interested in the size of venture capital markets per se, but in the extent
to which a change in the size of venture capital markets translates proportionately more
into early stage and high-tech investments. The ratios capture precisely this effect.
The methodological reasons for our emphasis on ratios are equally important. As it is
well known (see Hellmann (1998)) estimating a structural model of demand and supply is
made problematic by the unobservability of the rate of return on venture capital invest-
ments and by the difficulty in convincingly identifying variables which affect only demand
or only supply. For this reason most previous studies chose to estimate reduced form equa-
tions, where the level of venture capital investment is regressed against a set of observable
factors which are expected to affect both supply and demand. This estimation strategy,
however, is likely to suffer from serious endogeneity problems. To see why consider the





dt + εit (1)
εit = ηi + νit (2)
where yit denotes a measure of venture capital investment in country i at time t, xit
is a vector of time-varying country specific characteristics, and dt is a T × 1 vector of
year dummies with 1 in the t-th position and 0 otherwise. The error term εit consists
of a country component, ηi, and an idiosyncratic term, νit. Unobservable time-varying
macroeconomic effects are captured by year dummies. We then ask which genuinely time-
varying, country-specific policies are responsible for the evolution of the innovation ratios,
and thus for the development of active venture capital markets.
The econometric challenge is to consistently estimate β under reasonable identifica-
tion assumptions. Problems here can arise for two different reasons. First, some of our
explanatory policy variables are likely to be correlated with unobservable (or unobserved)
time-invariant, country-level omitted variables. For instance, countries can be thought of
as being characterized by different propensities to innovate, related to the structure of the
economy, that evolve very slowly over time and consequently can be reasonably assumed
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to remain constant over our sample period. In turn, these propensities are likely to be
correlated both with the level of venture capital investment and with at least one of our
policy variables, namely the stock of public R&D capital. Analogously, countries may have
different, and relatively constant, preferences for the level of public spending. In turn, these
preferences are likely to be correlated with those tax rates which the theoretical literature
suggests to be important determinants of the demand and the supply of venture capital.
Since these preferences are also likely to affect the level of venture capital, for instance
because of a crowding out effect between public and private spending, their omission is
expected to make standard least squares estimation techniques biased and inconsistent.
To overcome this first source of endogeneity it is standard practice to apply the so-called
’within-group’ transformation. We then use country fixed effects to identify unobservable
time-invariant factors such as legal origin or the industrial specialization of individual
countries. This estimation technique allows us to consistently estimate β in the presence
of time-invariant omitted variables that can be arbitrarily related to the observables.
The second problem is that the identification of structural effects through regression
coefficients in deviations from country specific means (i.e. the within-group transforma-
tion) requires the lack of correlation between the regressors and the idiosyncratic error
term at all leads and lags. This strict exogeneity assumption rules out the possibility that
current values of some of the explanatory variables are correlated with present and past
idiosyncratic errors. This is unlikely to be the case in the framework defined by (1) and
(2) when yit is the level of venture investments in country i at time t. In this case the
idiosyncratic component of the error term includes unobserved time-varying factors like
national reforms in product and factor markets which are likely both to affect the level of
venture capital investment and to be jointly determined with our explanatory variables.
The textbook solution to this second source of endogeneity is to find convincing external
instruments, clearly an objective almost impossible to achieve in multivariate cross-country
regressions. An alternative strategy, that we adopt in this paper, is to use ratios instead
of levels as dependent variables. Looking at ratios instead of at levels contributes to the
solution of this endogeneity problem to the extent that the omitted time-varying country-
specific explanatory variables equally affect the two components–high- versus low-tech,
early versus late stage–of total venture capital investment which enter the innovation
ratios.
2.2 Motivating the choice of policy variables
Imperfections in capital markets are an important reason for public intervention. In the
context of venture capital innovative firms are likely to suffer from credit constraints be-
cause they have little collateral, as formalized in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). Their
model extends to the double moral hazard framework–typically used in models of ven-
ture capital financing–the seminal contribution of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) on credit
rationing. Financing of companies with low collateral requires monitoring, which reduces
entrepreneurial private benefits and thus increases entrepreneurial effort. Low collateral
firms would be rationed by arms’ length lenders, unless they obtain finance by venture
capitalists. However, this form of intermediation is more expensive, since monitoring is a
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costly activity. Therefore, in equilibrium, low collateral firms pay a premium on the funds
they borrow; moreover, companies whose collateral is below a certain threshold cannot
even obtain finance, since they need to borrow such a large amount that they would be
unable to service it.1 In this context, an increase in the supply of funds reduces the interest
rate, making funds affordable for low collateral companies. Similarly, an increase in the ex-
pected (risk-adjusted, net of taxes) return on investment makes funding of high-collateral
companies acceptable by arm’s length financiers–even without monitored co-financing by
venture capitalists–thus freeing up venture funds for low collateral firms. In both cases
the innovation ratios increase. With binding credit constraints, we would then find that
investment in low collateral firms–and therefore the innovation ratios–responds to policy
instruments affecting both the supply of funds and investment expected return.
A simple extension of the model by Holmstrom and Tirole, available from the authors
upon request, shows that there may be excess supply of venture capital funds together
with credit rationing of low collateral firms because their expected rate of return does
not cover the venture capitalist’s monitoring costs.2 In this context, more funds do not
stimulate investment in low collateral firms, and we expect both innovation ratios to
remain unaffected by an increase in the supply of funds: more funds are simply going to
be invested by venture capitalists in mature firms.
On the contrary, policy instruments that affect the return to investment should in-
fluence the innovation ratios irrespective of credit constraints. When the (after tax, risk-
adjusted) return on investment increases, it allows companies with less collateral to gain
access to external finance, thus stimulating the innovation ratios. The first such instru-
ment is taxation. Taxation has long been pointed to as a driver of both entrepreneurship
and venture capital investment (Poterba (1989a,b), Gompers and Lerner (1998)). Different
theories look at the effect of alternative forms of taxation on the demand and supply of
venture funds. A relevant portion of the return to investment accrues to entrepreneurs and
venture firms in the form of capital gains, when the company is either sold or floated on
the stock market. A reduction in the personal capital gains tax rate should then stimulate
the demand of venture funds by entrepreneurs (Poterba, 1989a,b); by the same reason, a
reduction in the corporate capital tax gain should stimulate the supply of venture funds by
industrial companies and institutional investors. Moreover, a reduction in the corporate
capital tax rates augments venture capitalists’ incentive to exert effort in monitoring en-
trepreneurs (Keuschnigg (2004), Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2004)), raising the success rate
of venture-backed firms and therefore their expected return. The latter effect is especially
relevant for public policy since venture capitalists’ effort is likely to be under-provided,
because she bears all the monitoring costs but shares with the entrepreneur the revenue
gains generated by her monitoring services (Keuschnigg and Nielsen (2003)). Therefore,
a reduction in the (personal or corporate) capital gains tax rate is expected to increase
1The large empirical literature on credit constraints at firm level documents that high-tech companies
have limited funding (see for example Carpenter and Petersen (2002), Hall (2002), and Guiso (1998), and
the references cited therein).
2The existence of excess supply of venture capital may not be unrealistic, since there is evidence pointing
to a ’money chasing deals’ phenomenon in both the 1980s and 1990s in the U.S. (Gompers and Lerner
(2000), Kaplan and Stein (1993)).
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the investment in high-tech and early stage companies, thus leading to an increase inthe
innovation ratios.
The relative strength of demand and supply effects also depends on the structure of
tax exemptions. For instance, in the U.S. the effect of a reduction in taxation is expected
to be larger for the demand than for the supply because institutional investors in the U.S.
are tax exempt (Gompers and Lerner (1998)). This is also the reason why the empirical
literature has mainly focussed on the personal capital gains taxation. Looking at European
data suggests instead to focus on the corporate capital gain tax rate, since the providers
of funds are typically incorporated and taxed (EVCA (2003)).
The demand for venture funds is also linked to the personal income tax rate, which
constitutes the second effect of taxation that we explore. Since entrepreneurs receive most
of their return in the form of a capital gain, we expect a larger number of workers choosing
to become entrepreneurs when the difference between the (marginal) personal income and
capital gains tax rates increases, a point first advanced by Poterba (1989b).
The amount of the capital gain itself is affected by the discounted value of future tax
liabilities at the time of the sale of the company. A higher corporate income tax rate will
thus reduce investment in high-tech and early stage companies through its effect on net
project return. By the same token, it will also reduce the provision of monitoring services
by venture capitalists. Also in this case, the effect of a change in taxation will be larger the
larger is the expected (gross-of-tax) capital gain, so that a reduction in taxation should
increase the innovation ratios.
An additional effect one should consider is that of loss carry-forward provisions. These
provisions allow companies to deduct present losses from future taxable income. By de-
creasing the potential loss, they may encourage risk-taking and therefore the demand for
venture capital from high-tech and early stage companies. Such effect is more likely to fall
on early stage companies, so that one would expect it to be more relevant for the early
stage ratio.
Beyond taxation, theory suggests other factors as likely to influence the innovation
ratios through their influence on the return on investment. The opening of stock markets
suitable for listing entrepreneurial companies reduces flotation costs for entrepreneurial
firms, as argued in the model developed by Michelacci and Suarez (2004). Lower flotation
costs, in turn, determine an increase in the rate of business creation. When only stock
exchanges for mature firms are available, the expertise of the venture capitalist is ’held
up’ for longer in a given entrepreneurial firm, because flotation costs decrease as the firm
accumulates a track record. Since venture capitalist’s expertise is a scarce resource with
a fixed supply, the reduction of flotation costs allows to free up such expertise earlier.
Moreover, exit by listing provides a higher return to entrepreneurs and investors than the
sale to an established firm–a fact documented by Brau, Francis and Kohers (2002) and
Gompers and Lerner (1997). We then expect both innovation ratios, and especially the
early stage ratio, to increase following the opening of a stock market for entrepreneurial
companies.
Policy can spur venture capital markets also by helping create new entrepreneurial
opportunities. A large literature documents and explains the existence of positive spillovers
due to expenditure in research and development (R&D). When there are spillovers in
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R&D, past inventions raise the productivity of research today, increasing the return to
start-up investment (e.g., Aghion and Howitt (1998), Romer (1990)). Recent empirical
studies confirm that R&D spillovers can be quite large (Jones and Williams (1998), and
references therein).3 Looking at U.S. sector-level data, Hirukawa and Ueda (2003) even
argue that, at the aggregate level, it may be innovation activity to lead the development
of venture capital, and not vice versa. Gompers and Lerner (1998) also emphasize the role
of R&D expenditure in the development of the U.S. venture capital industry.
On these bases, we expect an increase in the stock of R&D to translate into a higher
return for new ventures. This will stimulate both the demand and the supply of venture
capital. It will also stimulate the innovation ratios to the extent that the spillover effects
are stronger for the creation of new companies (as opposed to the growth of existing
ventures) and for technologically advanced industries (as opposed to mature ones).
Finally, entrepreneurship depends on the legal and regulatory environment, which is
largely determined by public policy. While our conceptual understanding of the entrepre-
neurial process is still rudimentary, recent advances have shown the importance of legal
and regulatory aspects. For instance, different forms of protection of property rights in-
duce different entrepreneurial behavior (Anton and Yao (2002), Baccara and Razin (2004)).
The design of bankruptcy and of labor markets also affects the incentive to become an
entrepreneur (Gromb and Scharfstein (2002), Landier (2002)).4 We would then expect a
reduction in legal and regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship to increase the (after tax,
risk-adjusted) expected return to creating high-tech and early stage companies, which
should in turn increase the innovation ratios.
Which of these different policy approaches, if any, receive support from the data is
however unclear. Our study contributes to their evaluation by assessing their effectiveness
in raising the innovation ratios.
2.3 Public policy for active venture capital markets in the European
context
After motivating our choice of policy variables it is useful to discuss the European context
which provides the background for our analysis. Europe provides a particularly interesting
environment in this respect, since its venture capital markets have developed only recently,
and have been the target of several important policy initiatives. Until the early 1990s, there
was very little venture capital activity in Europe, but this has substantially grown in the
second half of the decade (Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002a)). While never reaching the ab-
solute or per capital level of the U.S., European venture capital has also experienced a
less pronounced fall in fund-raising and investments at the turn of the century (Bottazzi
and Da Rin (2004)). The share of early stage and high-tech investments has also increased
3Consistent with this view, Feldman and Lichtenberg (1997), using European data, find that a country’s
private companies specialize in the same scientific fields as its universities and public R&D organizations.
4 Ideally, we would like to include a country-specific, time-varying measure of the leniency of bankruptcy
laws. Unfortunately such a measure is not availabe. Only in 2003 has the European Venture Capital
Association started collecting systematic, albeit qualitative, data on bankruptcy.
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over time, moving closer to the U.S. pattern. Still, Europe remains a quite different envi-
ronment for venture capital. For instance, there are stronger differences in the legal and
regulatory environments across European countries then across U.S. states. Even more
importantly, European venture capital relies more heavily on banks than on institutional
investors. A good third of the funds come from banking sources, and about 20% of the
venture capital firms are bank subsidiaries. Moreover, venture capital firms remain con-
siderably less numerous than in the U.S., despite a reduction in the gap during the mid
1990s. As a result, European venture capital markets still have to reach the maturity of
the U.S. markets. Therefore, the policy experience accumulated in Europe over the last
decade constitutes a valuable experimental ground from which many emerging markets
can learn about the effectiveness of alternative policies.
The main policy initiatives in Europe have been targeted at the increase of the supply
of funds for new ventures.5 The European Commission made the increase of the supply of
risk capital one priority of its policy towards innovation and capital markets (European
Commission (1998, 2003)), and in 2001 it transformed the European Investment Fund
(EIF) into Europe’s largest venture investor with an injection of more than 2 billion euros
(EIF (2002)). The Risk Capital Action Plan adopted by the European Commission in
1998, subscribed to this view and greatly influenced national policies in the late 1990s
(European Commission (1998)). This approach is shared by many national programmes,
from Germany’s federal and regional schemes for innovative companies (German Federal
Ministry for Economics and Technology (1999)), to the French ’Plan Innovation’ (French
Ministry of Industry (2003)), to the transformation of the Danish Growth Fund into a
public venture fund in 2001 (Danish Growth Fund (2003)), and to the creation of the UK
High Technology Fund (HM Treausury (2003)).6
Other policies have also been tried out in Europe. Several forms of taxation have
undergone a broad trend towards reduction (EVCA (2003)). For example, investment
vehicles with a favorable taxation have been introduced in 1995 in the UK (’Venture
Capital Trust’) and in 1997 in France (’Fonds Communs de Placement dans l’Innovation’—
FCPI). Reductions in effective taxation have also been enacted in Germany (1998 and
2000), the Netherlands (1996), Spain (1996 and 2001). Corporate and personal income tax
have also been reduced (European Commission - DG Enterprise (2002)).
The creation of ’New Markets’ for the listing of entrepreneurial companies in sev-
eral countries provides an interesting experiment for the evaluation of this type of policy
(Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002a)).7
5 Interestingly, while venture capital was born in the U.S. out of private initiative, its expansion benefited
from the Small Business Innovation Research programme in the 1980s (Gans and Stern (2003), Lerner
(1999)). This programme, which invested several billion dollars, was largely motivated by the fear that
insufficient financing was available to innovative small firms.
6Public programmes aimed at increasing the supply of venture capital have also been implemented in
several emerging economies, from Chile to India (Carter, Barger, and Kuczynski (1996), Gilson (2003),
Lerner and Schoar (2005)). In Israel, the Yozma programme, started in 1992, provided 100 million dollars
of public funding to attract private funds for over 150 millions (Avnimelech and Teubal (2002)). Yozma
helped create ten private venture capital firms and to jump-start a successful and active venture capital
market.
7Notice that the creation of ’New’ stock markets started in 1997 and was completed by 1999 in most
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The increase in R&D expenditure has become a priority of European governments
in the last decade. The Barcelona European Council of March 2002 set the objective to
increase the average investment in R&D in Europe from 1.9% to 3.0% by 2010, of which
two thirds to be funded by the private sector (European Commission (2002)).
Policies aimed at improving regulatory design have been part of a broad trend towards
deregulation in Europe over the 1990s, as documented in a series of OECD studies reviewed
in Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003). In particular, several countries have made an attempt
to reduce regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship, with results which have been favorably
assessed by recent empirical analyses (Alesina et al. (2005) and Klapper, Laeven, and
Rajan (2004)).
3 The Data
3.1 Data sources and description
Our analysis is based on a panel of data gathered from several sources. We consider data
for the following 14 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the UK
over the years between 1988 and 2001.8
3.1.1 Dependent variables
Our source for the dependent variables is the European Venture Capital Association
(EVCA), whose yearbooks are compiled from an extensive yearly survey of member and
non-member firms.9 For each year and country, we look at the reported amount of total
investment. This is divided into five categories: seed, start-up, expansion, replacement cap-
ital, and buyouts. We define venture capital (VC) to be the sum of the first four categories,
and non-venture private equity to equal the last one. The sum of venture and non-venture
private equity investments is referred to as (total) private equity (PE). We then partition
venture capital investments into early stage (ES)–equal to the sum of seed and start-
up investments–and late stage (LS)–equal to expansion investments and replacement
capital.
We define high-tech investments (HT) as the sum of investments in the following sec-
tors: communications, computer related, other electronics related, biotechnology, medical
and health related. Low-tech investments (LT) are investments in the remaining sectors:
countries. As our descriptive statistics below make clear, this should dispel concerns for endogeneity, since
the opening of these markets predates the increase in supply of venture capital which took place starting
from 1998.
8We do not include in our analysis the US in order to avoid measurement errors. While the US constitute
the world’s largest private equity market, the venture capital data collected by the National Venture Capital
Association (NVCA) are coded with different definitions than those of the EVCA.
9For details on the EVCA database see the methodology section of EVCA (2001).
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energy, consumer related, industrial products and services, chemicals, industrial automa-
tion, other manufacturing, transportation, financial and other services, agriculture, and
construction. All sums are expressed in millions of year 2000 euros. Finally, we define the
two innovation ratios: the High-Tech Ratio is the ratio of HT to PE, and the Early Stage
Ratio is the ratio of ES to VC.10
3.1.2 Independent variables
Our measure of the funds raised by venture capital firms is the total amount of funds
raised from all sources by a country’s private equity firms in given year.11 We express all
values in euros, using the synthetic euro exchange rate of Datastream for the conversion.
From Datastream we also download population and price indices for all countries. We use
population to express values in per capita terms, and price indices to obtain constant 2000
values.
Our next set of variables is built from five different tax rates. Based on the above
discussion, we consider the following taxation variables. To capture the effect of capital
gains taxation we consider the corporate capital gains taxation. To consider how relative
taxation affects the decision to become an entrepreneur, we consider the difference between
the personal income taxation and the personal capital gains tax rate. To consider the effect
of corporate income taxation on the present discounted value of the (expected) capital
gain, we consider the corporate income tax rate. Finally, we examine a synthetic measure
of the generosity of loss carry-forward provisions. We obtain our measures of capital gains
taxation from two sources, both published by Ernst&Young, a leading tax consulting
firm. Country information is compiled by Ernst&Young local offices, which ensures high
professional standards and consistency, both over time and across countries. The first
source is the Worldwide Corporate Tax Guide. Each year, the Guide reports for over 140
countries the main corporate tax rates. From the Guide, we take the corporate capital
gains tax rate and the (marginal) corporate income tax rate. We also take information
about loss offset and loss carry-forward provisions. The second Ernst&Young source we
use is The Global Executive, a guide to the taxation of executives in over 130 countries.
From this yearly source we obtain the (marginal) personal tax rate and the (marginal)
personal capital gains tax rate.
Our measure for the exit opportunity for venture investments is the existence of a stock
market suitable for entrepreneurial companies, since several European countries opened
such trading segments within their stock markets during the 1990s (Bottazzi and Da Rin
(2002b)). For all European ’New’ stock markets we obtain the date of opening from the
respective stock exchanges, and use a dummy variable which takes value 1 when a stock
10 Ideally, we would like to be able to measure the High-Tech Ratio as the ratio of HT to VC. A limitation
of the EVCA data is that they do not provide a separate sectoral disaggregation for venture and non-venture
private equity.
11Note that while funds invested are recorded according to which countries they go into (the ’country of
destination’ criterion), funds raised are recorded by the country where the venture firm is based (the ’coun-
try of management criterion,’ see EVCA (2001)). Baygan and Freudenberg (2000) discuss the importance
of cross-border capital flows, which in Europe–while increasing over time–remain relatively small.
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market for entrepreneurial companies is available and 0 otherwise.
To measure the arrival of entrepreneurial opportunities, we use the amount of public
R&D expenditure. From the OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators database we
obtain yearly data on country-level total research and development (R&D) expenditure,
business and government R&D, and R&D in higher-education. We measure R&D spillovers
with the standard perpetual inventory methodology, which we describe in the Appendix.
We collect our measure of the ’hiring and firing’ barrier to entrepreneurship from yearly
issues of the World Competitiveness Yearbook compiled since 1989 by the IMD business
school. The Yearbook provides 241 country-level quantitative and qualitative measures
of competitiveness assembled from public data and surveys of local business leaders in
60 countries. From the Yearbook we obtain data on the flexibility of hiring and firing
practices. Table 1 provides the definitions of all the variables we use in the analysis.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
We start exploring our data by looking at descriptive evidence. In Table 2 we notice that
less than a quarter of venture capital investment goes to early stage projects, and less than
a third of the total private equity investments is in high-tech.
Two Figures look at the evolution over time for the aggregate of the 14 countries we
consider. Figure 1 plots the innovation ratios, and Figure 2 the total supply of funds into
private equity. The sharp upturn in the supply of funds starting in 1996 and its equally
sharp fall since 2001 is mirrored in a sharp drop in the innovation ratios. At first sight,
this seems to suggest that the supply of funds may in fact pose a binding constraint on
investment, and seems to provide evidence of a positive relationship between the supply
of private equity funds and the innovation ratios. In our regressions we ask whether this
visual evidence can be given a structural interpretation or not.
For each country, Figure 3 reports 3-year moving averages of the innovations ratios,
which provide further evidence of the pattern shown by Figure 3. For both ratios, we notice
some variability across countries. While such cross-country variability naturally asks for
an explanation, the nature of our data suggests to explore the time dimension of the data
and control for country-specific factors as discussed in Section 2.1.
4 Regression results
4.1 Main results
We address the effectiveness of different policies by estimating several versions of the panel
equations (1) and (2).Our main specification contains the following explanatory variables:
our dummy measure for the opening of stock markets of entrepreneurial companies, mea-
sures of taxation, the stock of public R&D, the measure of barriers to entrepreneurship,
and the supply of funds into private equity.
Our choice of taxation variables requires some further comment. In Table 3 we present
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pairwise correlations for the corporate capital gains tax rate (CGT it), the difference be-
tween the (marginal) personal income tax rate and the personal capital gains tax rate
(DIT it), and the corporate income tax rate (CIT it).12 The two measures of corporate
taxation turn out to be highly correlated. This is not surprising since Europe has seen
a trend towards lighter taxation in the last decade, which also involved lower personal
income taxes. Such correlation suggests that we avoid using both corporate tax rates in
our regression. We choose to use the corporate capital gains taxation, and consider the
corporate income tax rate in an extension we discuss in Section 4.2. While this strategy
prevents us to make full use of our dataset, it delivers more reliable estimates.
We normalize all the measures of investments, the stock of public R&D (RD it), and
the supply of funds (SF it) by the population in country i at year t in order to abide by the
strict exogeneity assumption. Using gross domestic product in the regression, a common
practice in the literature, would violate the assumption. By the same reason, we construct
the stock of R&D using only public expenditure, since private (’business’) expenditure
would also violate strict exogeneity; and we refrain from using patents as a measure of
innovation and the number of IPO listings as a measure of the availability of an ’exit’ for
venture investments.
Results from the estimation of this specification are presented in Tables 4 and 5.
Each Table refers to a specific innovation ratio, and reports estimated coefficients together
with the corresponding standard errors. Since (unreported) time dummies are included
in all equations, our estimates genuinely pick the effects of changes in our explanatory
variables. For example, the effects of the availability of a ’New’ stock market targeted at
entrepreneurial companies are captured beyond a common cyclical trend.
Our main results can be summarized as follow. We find consistent evidence that policy
can contribute to the creation of active capital markets, but that not all policies are
effective. Three types of policy have an effect on the innovation ratios: the corporate
capital gains taxation, the opening of ’New’ stock markets, and the reduction of barriers
to entrepreneurship.
First, increases in the corporate capital gains tax rate have a consistently negative
effect on both innovation ratios. The economic effect of an increase in the capital gains
tax is positive and large: moving the marginal tax rate (CGT it) from the lower tail (25th
percentile ) to its higher tail (75th percentile) decreases the high-tech ratio by about 0.065
(or 22%). The tax incentive to remain an employee rather than become an entrepreneur has
a positive, and insignificant, effect on the high-tech ratio in the more general specification;
however it becomes significant when we do not include the capital gains tax rate. One
possible interpretation is that the positive correlation among tax rates captures a broad
trend whose precise effects we may not be able to capture. The effect on the early stage
ratio has the same sign but is estimated imprecisely.
Second, we find the opening of a ’New’ market to have a positive and significant effect
on both the early stage and the high-tech ratios. The economic effect in this case is also
noticeable, as the opening of a ’New’ market raises both innovation ratios by about 10%.
12We deal with loss carry-forward provisions in the next Section, since its measurement requires some
further assumptions.
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This result is consistent across all our specifications and conforms to our predictions. It
also suggests a sobering approach to the critiques of the recent experience of the ’New’
stock markets, which often focus on the issue of losses to individual investors. Our results
provide a more positive perspective by stressing the importance of this exit option for
active venture capital markets.
Third, a reduction of the barriers to entrepreneurship (’hiring and firing’ restrictions)
turns out to be positive and statistically significant in most specifications for the high-tech
ratio. This effect is also economically large: moving the hiring and firing measure from its
25th to its 75th percentile raises the high-tech ratio by 0.075 (or 26%).
Another notable result is that, in all reported equations, the supply of funds is never
statistically different from zero. This holds for both innovation ratios; it is also robust to
several alternative definitions of the supply of fund and specifications that we describe
in the next section. Therefore we do not find evidence supporting the ’limited supply’ of
venture capital hypothesis in Europe during our sample period which has inspired so many
policy initiatives.
Finally, the stock of public R&D capital is found to have a negligible, statistically
insignificant, effect on the innovation ratios.13 This suggests that increasing public R&D
does not result in a higher return for early stage or high-tech entrepreneurial ventures.
4.2 Extentions and robustness checks
In this Section we extend our results, especially by delving more deeply into the lack of
evidence for a role of the supply of funds, and address several methodological concerns.
First of all, we explore different definitions of the supply of funds, and report our main
extensions in Tables 6 and 7. Column (i) of both Tables take care of the fact that the funds
raised by venture capital companies in one particular year are not necessarily invested
in the same year (Gompers and Lerner(2000)). This may suggest that our baseline static
model suffers from a dynamic misspecification problem. To address this additional concern
we rerun all our equations after including the once lagged variable, SFit−1 to the original
specification. While we lose some observations due to the use of a lagged variable, this
does not alter significantly our overall results.
A second extension is suggested by the fact that the ’bubble years’ of the late 1990s
might have been characterized by an excess supply of funds, while the previous period
by a shortage of funds. Our results in Tables 4 and 5 might therefore suffer from pooling
together two different regimes. Column (ii) of Tables 6 and 7 report our results, where we
identify the ’bubble’ years with 1997 through 2000. We find no evidence of a different role
of the supply of funds in these two sub-periods.
Another possibility we want to examine is that countries may experience a different
effect of the supply of funds depending on the stage of development of their venture capital
markets. Arguably, countries where venture capital markets are less developed may also
experience a lack of professional expertise which might have an adverse effect on the
13As a check on the robustness of this result, we also use the stock of total R&D, which includes private
(business) R&D, despite the fact that it clearly fails the strict exogeneity requirement.
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innovation ratios. We define ’developed’ to be a country with a (per capita) supply of
funds higher than the median at the start of our panel (1988).14 Column (iii) of Tables 6
and 7 reports the results of a specification where we allow for a different effect of the supply
of funds depending on the development of a country’s venture capital markets. With this
equation we explore the possibility that a limited supply of venture capital is more likely
to be found in countries with a less mature venture capital markets. This extension has
no effect on our estimates.15
We have chosen not to use the corporate income tax rate in the main specification for
its correlation with the corporate capital gains tax rate. When we modify our specification
and use the former tax rate instead, we find similar (though somewhat less precisely
estimated) results.
We have not included loss carry-forward provisions in the main specification. This is
because obtaining a measure of these provisions requires some additional assumptions.
First, there are sometimes limfits on the losses a company can carry forward.16 More
importantly, sometimes there is a short time limit on such provision and sometimes there
is no limit. One then needs to make an assumption on how to measure such ’infinite’ carry-
forward provisions. We build a measure of the generosity of loss carry-forward provisions
equal to the number of years a loss can be carried forward. When there is no limit, we
put a value of ten, equal to the maximum (finite) limit within our sample. If we include
such (admittedly crude) measure in our regressions, this turns out to have no effect on
the innovation ratios, and our main results are not affected. One possible reason for the
ineffectiveness of this policy is its lack of variability–most countries have at most one
change in the measure over the sample period. Loss offset provisions, which allow a refund
of past tax liabilities for companies with current losses, may also affect the innovation
ratios. Here as well we need to make some additional assumption. We categorize this
variable by the number of years it allows go back. The minimum number of years is zero
and the maximum is three. When we add our loss offset provision our results do not
change, and the measure itself has no explanatory power.
We then turn to several possible methodological concerns, for which we estimate, but
do not report, additional variations of our basic specification.
First, our findings might not be robust to alternative definitions of our variables. In
particular, it might be argued that the replacement capital component should be excluded
from venture capital investment. This, in turn, would alter the denominator of the Early
Stage Ratio. To address this concern we rerun all our reported equations after redefining
the Early Stage Ratio. Our findings are virtually unaltered. The same happens when we
modify the supply of funds variable to include realized capital gains.
Another concern regards the role of different components of the supply of funds. To
14The countries which turn out to have a relatively less mature venture capital equity industry in 1988
are Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
15 In unreported regressions, we also check that this results does not change if we allow a country to
switch every year between ’developed’ and ’not developed.’
16 In most country-years there are also limits to the application of such provisions in case the company is
acquired. This is done to avoid generating an artificial market in loss-making companies which may result
in tax elusion.
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this purpose we disaggregate the sources of funds.17 Such disaggregation is intuitively
appealing, but it is methodologically questionable, since leaving out some components of
the supply of funds introduces an additional source of omitted variables problem. First,
we single out funds supplied by institutional investors (insurance companies and academic
institutions). It can be argued that these investors instruct venture fund managers to
comply with well defined objectives (Mayers, Schoors, and Yafeh (2002)), given their longer
run perspective than other investors. When we isolate these funds, we do not find any
significant changes, and the significance of this variable is far from any acceptable level.
Similarly, we explore in our context the result of Gompers and Lerner (1998) on the role
of pension funds. They show that the clarification of the ’prudent man rule’ in the context
of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act brought to a surge of pension fund
investments in venture capital. To date, pension funds remain the largest single source of
venture capital in the U.S. (NVCA (2003)). Several countries in Europe began reforming
the structure of their social security system from pay-as-you-go to funded in the 1990s. As
a consequence, the financial assets of pension funds have increased. Since these institutions
are allowed to invest in venture capital, as long as adequate diversification is maintained,
their funding of venture capital has increased. However, when we isolate the supply of
venture capital which comes from pension funds we find no evidence of a distinct role of
pension funds.
The other important component of the supply of funds we isolate is government funds.
These constitute the direct policy instrument for increasing the supply of venture funds.
Arguably, the government may be more interested in the creation of long-run growth
opportunities than the maximization of its profits, so public funds can be expected to
be particularly targeted at high-tech and early stage companies. We have not focussed
on these funds in the main text because of the methodological concern discussed in the
previous paragraph, which makes the total supply of funds a sounder explanatory variable.
Still, if we look at the effect of government funds alone, we do not obtain any different
results.
We have used two different denominators for the innovation ratios. Data limitations
have forced us to use in the High-Tech Ratio the amount invested in private equity and
not only in venture capital. To ensure that our results are not affected by the choice of
denominator, we also estimate the early stage ratio with the same denominator, and we
find that the results are not sensitive to this change.
An important assumption in our analysis so far has been that the presence of a New
stock market is by itself sufficient to affect the innovation ratios–i.e., that investors are
always willing to buy shares of companies which go public. However, it is well know that the
markets for Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) experience cycles which bring them over waves
of ’hot’ or ’cold’ investor appetite. In other words, the sheer availability of a stock market
may by itself not be enough to stimulate venture investment. To explore this possibility
we introduce in the analysis a panel of stock market indices. For each country, we obtain
from Datastream the yearly average of the MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International)
17The EVCA data breaks the sources of funds into the following categories: realized capital gains,
corporations, individuals, government agencies, banks, pension funds, insurance companies, funds of funds,
academic institutions, capital markets.
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stock market index for the main stock market. We take the MSCI index to be a measure
of investors’ appetite for stocks of entrepreneurial firms. Notice that we employ the MSCI
index for the main market rather than for any ’New’ market–or the number of IPOs in
the current or previous year–in order to abide by the strict exogeneity condition. We
then estimate a set of equations where we include the MSCI index as an explanatory
variable. We introduce this variable both with an additive and a multiplicative term. In
either case, this variable is not significant, and its inclusion does not affect the magnitude
or significance of the coefficient for the New markets.
An important concern is that the real bottleneck is not money but people. Michelacci
and Suarez (2004) do stress the human factor in financial intermediation, whose empirical
importance is documented in Bottazzi, Da Rin, and Hellmann (2005b). To address this
issue, we construct a variable consisting, for each country and year, of the number of
venture capital firms which are members of the European Venture Capital Association.
We then use this variable in alternative to the supply of funds. The resulting estimates
confirm our main results by not showing any sign of a shortage.
One specific concern can be raised in relation to the Early Stage Ratio. It is well known
that venture-backed companies typically receive staged financing (Gompers (1995)). This
means that the company will receive funds over several rounds across a few years. Since
the company would then progressively mature from the seed or start-up stages to later
stage deals there is clear suspicion that the figures for late stage financing simply reflect
’life-cycle’ effects and not investment decisions by the venture capitalists. We can control
for this important observation by including in our regressions for the early stage ratio
the lagged value of the absolute amount of early stage investments. We are comforted by
noticing that our results are unchanged.
Finally, one could be concerned that our results are driven by a single country. We
discard this possibility by re-running our regressions excluding one country at a time.
Overall, therefore, our results appear to be consistently robust to a wide variety of checks.
4.3 Relating our results to previous studies
While we have proposed an innovative methodology for analyzing the role of public policy
in creating active venture capital markets, we also want to relate our results to those of
the extant literature. To this purpose, in Tables 8 and 9 we report estimates of equation
(1) where the dependent variables are levels of venture capital investments. In Table 8 we
report estimates for high-tech and low-tech investments, and in Table 9 for early stage and
late stage investments. While these estimates are likely to suffer from the methodological
problems we discussed in Section 2.1, they are useful for relating our own findings to those
of previous studies.
The results for level estimates are broadly consistent with previous studies, and also
with our results for the innovation ratios. Corporate capital gains taxation turns out to
have some effect on the level of high-tech and early stage venture investments. In particular,
lower taxation provides an incentive to invest more in high-tech and early stage projects
rather than in low-tech and late stage. This result corroborates that by Gompers and
Lerner (1998), who looked at U.S. data during the 1976-94 period. Their finding was
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based on a panel of U.S. state-level data, where variation in capital gains tax rates is very
small; in fact their results were driven by a short time-series of federal-level variations in
capital gains taxation. Our results are also consistent with the cross-sectional comparison
of ’legal and tax friendliness’ across European countries in 2002 by Armour and Cummings
(2003).
Similarly, our finding that opening a ’new market’ for listing entrepreneurial companies
has a positive effect on venture investments confirms the positive effect of the number of
IPOs found by Cumming, Fleming and Schwienbacher (2003) and of that of the market
value of IPOs found by Jeng and Wells (2000). That an increase in public R&D results
in an increase in the level of venture investment is consistent with a similar finding by
Gompers and Lerner (1998), who used academic R&D expenditure in different U.S. states.
Finally, we find that an additional euro of funds raised translates in less than ten cents
(three cents) of high-tech (early stage). Moreover, since low-tech and late-stage investments
increase proportionately, the estimation in levels confirms that the innovation ratios remain
unaffected. The same applies to the effect of the stock of R&D.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we use a panel data analysis to study how public policy can contribute to the
creation of active venture capital markets. The results we obtain from a panel of European
country-level data over 1988-2001 provide new insights on the effectiveness of alternative
policies.
The prevailing policy approach does not receive support from the data. Our results
cast more than a passing doubt on the attempt to increase the share of early stage and
high-tech venture investments by channeling more funds into venture capital markets,
consistent with a ’money chasing deals’ situation (Gompers and Lerner (2000)).
Rather, we find that policies which increase the expected return of innovative projects
are more successful in altering the composition of venture capital markets towards early
stage projects and projects in high-tech industries. A reduction in capital gains taxation
raises the share of early stage and high-tech investments. The availability of stock markets
targeted at entrepreneurial companies–which provide a lucrative exit channel–also has a
positive effects on the innovation ratios, while a reduction in barriers to entrepreneurship
leads to an increase in the high-tech ratio. Finally, the stock of public R&D holds no effect
on the innovation ratios.
These results suggest a novel interpretation of the ’European Paradox’ (European
Commission (1994))–the fact that Europe suffers from an inability to turn scientific com-
petence into commercially successful ventures. In the light of our findings, the Paradox
seems to be due not to a lack of funding or of attractive technological opportunities, but
rather to the difficulties to earn large profits from the creation of new companies, consistent
with recent models of entrepreneurship (e.g., Gromb and Scharfstein (2002)).
While we cannot offer a conclusive cost-benefit analysis of alternative policies, our
findings on their benefits have implications for policy-makers in countries with emerging
venture capital markets. There, the impact of policy early in their development might
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be particularly important. Even if they reflect the European experience, we believe our
results have a clear message: sensible policy should consider a wider set of instruments
than simply channeling more funds into venture capital.
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Appendix: Construction of the R&D Capital Stock
The public R&D capital stock (RDit) (measured at the end of period t) in real terms is
computed by a perpetual inventory method with a constant rate of depreciation (δ = 0.15).
The values of R&D public expenditure in local currency at current prices (Rit) are available
for each country from 1981 onward from OECD Basic Science and Technology Statistics
database. We deflate these data by using a country specific R&D deflator (Pit). The
benchmark for the first year used in estimation (RDi87) is then calculated by summing up








For subsequent years, the standard accumulation equation has been used:
RDit = (1− δ)RDit−1 +
Rit
Pit
, t = 1988, ..., 2001 (A2)
Finally, real R&D capital stock data have been made comparable across countries by
applying the 2000 exchange rate with the euro.
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HT ratio ES ratio








1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002
Note: All Ratios are computed for the aggregate of the 14 countries we consider. The ES Ratio
is defined as the ratio of ES t to VC t . The HT Ratio is defined as the ratio of HT t to PEt .
The Supply of Funds is the amount of funds raised by the European private equity industry. It is
normalized by the European population.
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Note: For each country, the ES Ratio is defined as the ratio of ES it to VC it , and the HT Ratio is
defined as the ratio of HT it to PE it . The figure shows three-year moving averages for each ratio.
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Table 1: Variables’ definitions
Variable Description
VENTURE CAPITAL (VC it) total investment in venture private equity, measured in
millions of 2000 euros and normalized by the country’s
population in year t.
BUY-OUTS(BO it) total investment in non-venture private equity, mea-
sured in millions of 2000 euros and normalized by the
country’s population in year t.
PRIVATE EQUITY (PE it) sum of VC it and BO it , measured in millions of 2000
euros and normalized by the country’s population in
year t.
HIGH-TECH (HT it) total private equity investment in communications,
computer related, other electronics related, biotech-
nology, medical and health related, measured in mil-
lions of 2000 euros and normalized by the country’s
population in year t.
LOW-TECH (LT it) total private equity investment in energy, consumer
related, industrial products and services, chemicals,
industrial automation, transportation, financial, other
services and manufacturing, agriculture, and construc-
tion, measured in millions of 2000 euros and normal-
ized by the country’s population in year t.
EARLY STAGE (ES it) total investment in early stage venture private equity,
measured in millions of 2000 euros and normalized by
the country’s population in year t.
LATE STAGE (LS it) total investment in late stage venture private equity
normalized by the country’s population in year t, mea-
sured in millions of 2000 euros.
HIGH—TECH RATIO (HTRit) ratio of HT it toPE it .
EARLY—STAGE RATIO (ESRit) ratio of ES it toVC it .
SUPPLY OF FUNDS (SF it) amount of funds raised by the private equity industry,
measured in millions of 2000 euros and normalized by
the country’s population in year t.
Table 1: Variables’ definitions (continued)
Variable Description
CORPORATE CAPITAL GAINS TAX
RATE (CGT it)
marginal corporate capital gains tax rate.
CORPORATE INCOME TAX RATE
(CIT it)
marginal tax rate on corporate income.
PERSONAL CAPITAL GAINS TAX
RATE (PCGT it)
marginal personal capital gains tax rate.
PERSONAL INCOME TAX RATE
(PIT it)
marginal personal income gains tax rate.
DIFFERENCE IN PERSONAL TAX
RATE (DPIT it)
difference between (PIT it) and PCGT it).
’NEW MARKET’ DUMMY(NM it) dummy that takes value 1 if a ’New Market’ is avail-
able for firms to list; 0 otherwise.
BARRIER (BARR—HF it) value of the ’hiring and firing’ labor regulations.
PUBLIC R&D STOCK (RD it) stock of public expenditure in R&D normalized by the
country’s population in year t.
Note: all observations are for country i at year t.
Table 2: Aggregate descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Median 5th Perc. 95th Perc. Obs
High-tech ratio 0.294 0.205 0.249 0.049 0.686 187
High-tech 0.076 0.132 0.024 0.001 0.411 187
Low-tech 0.162 0.273 0.072 0.004 0.653 187
Early stage ratio 0.218 0.151 0.187 0.036 0.515 187
Early stage 0.034 0.059 0.011 0.001 0.196 187
Late stage 0.104 0.128 0.061 0.004 0.350 187
Corporate capital gain tax rate 34.8% 6.0% 35.0 25.0 45.0 187
Difference in personal tax rate 13.8% 14.2% 8.0 0.0 36.0 187
’New Market’ dummy 0.257 — — — — 187
Barrier 6.299 0.976 6.353 4.657 7.940 187
Supply of funds 0.296 0.638 0.093 0.002 1.162 187
Public R&D stock 17.720 12.131 18.191 2.256 37.210 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1.
Table 3: Correlations among tax rates
(CGT it) (DPIT it) (CIT it)
Corporate capital gains tax rate (CGT it) 1.000 — —










Note: variables are defined in Table 1. p-values in patenthesis.


































Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.00] [0.01]
F-test on time dummies [0.06] [0.09] [0.09]
F-test on individual effects [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 187 187 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared) brackets. *,
**, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels.


































Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.01] [0.00] [0.03]
F-test on time dummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on individual effects [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 187 187 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared) brackets. *,
**, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels.












































Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on time dummies [0.09] [0.07] [0.05]
F-test on individual effects [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 171 187 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, except Bit , which is a dummy that takes value 0 in the years
between 1997 and 2000, and 1 otherwise; and Dit , which is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for those
countries whose venture capital market larger than the median European market in 1988 and 0 otherwise.
Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared) brackets. *, **, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 significance levels.


















































Time dummies included Yes Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.01] [0.01]
F-test on time dummies [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on individual effects [0.00] [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 171 187 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1, except Bit , which is a dummy that takes value 0 in the years
between 1997 and 2000, and 1 otherwise; and Dit , which is a dummy variable that takes value 1 for those
countries whose venture capital market larger than the median European market in 1988 and 0 otherwise.
Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared) brackets. *, **, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and
0.01 significance levels.


























Time dummies included Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on time dummies [0.00] [0.67]
F-test on individual effects [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 187 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared) brackets.
*, **, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels.


























Time dummies included Yes Yes
F-test on regressors [0.00] [0.00]
F-test on time dummies [0.00] [0.22]
F-test on individual effects [0.00] [0.00]
Number of observations 187 187
Note: variables are defined in Table 1. Standard errors (probability levels) in round (squared) brackets.
*, **, and *** denote 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels.
